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Reference price distortion∗
József Sákovics
University of Edinburgh
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Abstract
I show that when consumers (mis)perceive prices relative to reference prices,
budgets turn out to be soft, prices tend to be lower and the average quality of
goods sold decreases. These observations provide explanations for decentralized
purchase decisions, for people being happy with a purchase even when they have
paid their “valuation”, and for why trade might be detrimental to welfare.
1 Introduction
This paper is intended as a building block in the research programme started by
Richard Thaler (1980) towards a behaviorally based theory of consumer choice. As
I am wary of imposing ad hoc behavioral assumptions, I use the mere existence
of a single, empirically well-established1 trait of consumer behavior to provide an
explanation for a series of stylized facts and to make some further testable predictions.
∗I thank Randy Bucklin, Botond Ko˝szegi, CarmenMatutes and Peter Sinclair, as well as audiences
at the ESEM 2007, the 2007 mini-conference on "Behavioural Economics" in Edinburgh and the
Theory seminar in Manchester for useful comments.
1See Mazumdar et al. (2005) for a review of the literature.
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The observation underlying my analysis is that consumers have a prior idea of what a
certain item “would” cost, and this reference price affects their purchasing decision.
I do not want to theorize much about where this value comes from, though some kind
of “rational” expectation is a clear contender. The conceptual novelty of my approach
is that instead of assuming that the reference price affects preferences,2 I posit that
consumers behave as if they had standard preferences but had a distorted view of
observed prices. One could view this as a straightforward error in price perception,
but I prefer to think of it as a proxy for a more complex psychological phenomenon,
which nonetheless leads to the same behavior and has the same welfare consequences.
The nature of the misperception is simple: any price that is above the reference price
seems even higher, and any price below the reference price seems even lower than it
actually is. It is as if consumers were wearing glasses, where the concavity/convexity
of the lenses was determined by whether the reference price is higher or lower than
the price currently observed. As a further distinction from the literature, I do not
assume that consumers are loss averse (though I allow for it), not even in the limited
sense of price distortions being higher upwards than downwards.
Even before turning to market applications, one can use the above set-up to say
something revealing about people’s willingness to pay for an object. Depending on
the relative position of the price to the reference price, one can be willing to spend
more than one’s intrinsic valuation of the object, or alternatively, strictly less than
that. This observation is powerful in itself but, more importantly it can lead to a host
of further implications when our agents are involved in a more complex interaction.
Some of these I explore in this paper others are left for future research.
In the context of a market for a single homogeneous good, I show that equilibrium
2This has been the approach taken by all the theoretical studies, e.g. Thaler (1985), Putler
(1992), and more recently, Ariely et al. (2004), Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2005, 2006) and Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006). Winer (1986) sidesteps this issue by directly modelling the dependence of the
probability of purchase on the difference between the actual and the refernce price. While useful for
regression analysis, this approach does not lead to a full-fledged theory of consumer behavior.
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prices in Cournot markets would tend to be lower than in the neoclassical model,
for any market structure except perfect competition. This result also generalizes
to horizontally differentiated goods, since it is driven by the increase in the price
elasticity of demand as a result of the price distortion.
When there is vertical differentiation, I show that the loss of market share of a
high quality incumbent to a low quality entrant is increased as a result of reference
price dependence. This finding provides a (partial) explanation of why local high
quality firms may be driven out of the market by cheap low quality imports even
when this is not efficient.
Next, I turn to the optimal purchase quantity problem. Here I show that — if
some reasonable sufficient condition holds — the amount spent will vary in a some-
what counter-intuitive way: when the price is below (above) the reference price the
consumer spends more (less) than if she correctly predicts the price. Note that this
is without assuming that stockpiling is possible. When I incorporate this finding into
the standard consumer choice problem of choosing the optimal consumption bundle
given a budget constraint, it leads to notional/soft budgets,3 as they are satisfied not
for the true prices, rather the adjusted ones. I argue that this is not unreasonable,
especially in a situation of sequentially distributed choice.
Finally I review some of the relevant empirical literature and conclude.
2 The reference-adjusted price
Based on the evidence cited above, my first axiom posits the existence of a reference
price.
3Deaton (1977) has nearly hit on the idea of soft budget constraints in a model where there
is inflation but the consumers only observe the price increase of a single good at a time. If they
(wrongly) believe that the prices of the other goods have stayed constant, they will spend less than
optimal (and less than mentally budgeted) on the good at question. He then goes on to look at the
aggregate behavior of the economy and does not follow up the consequences on individual behavior.
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Axiom 1 Consumers have a reference price attached to each commodity. Different
consumers — or the same consumer at different times — need not attach the same
reference price to the same commodity.
Taking the existence of reference prices as given, the question is how do they influ-
ence the consumers’ purchasing decisions. One road to go down could be to assume
that the reference price (together with the actual price) enters the consumer’s utility
function. This is the road existing theoretical approaches have taken (c.f. footnote
2). I make the alternative assumption that neither the actual nor the reference price
affect the utility derived from purchasing an item.4 Instead, all the action takes place
via an adjustment of the actual price, which then modifies consumer behavior ex-
clusively through its effect on expenditure, without affecting preferences (assuming
quasi-linear utility). The literal interpretation for the price adjustment is that the
consumer misperceives the actual price. However, I am not making a physiologi-
cal/psychological statement here (as that is not my expertise). Rather, my claim
is that consumers behave as if they were unable to accurately observe prices. As
this approach does not interfere with preferences, it imposes strict discipline on the
way that reference-price effects can influence the consumer’s decision and welfare.
Whether it is an appropriate modelling device remains an empirical question.
Axiom 2 Each consumer is endowed with a price function, P (.; .),R2+ → R+, which
for every reference price, pR, maps from the actual prices, p, into adjusted prices,
pA. Consumers treat the adjusted price as a sufficient statistic for all price-related
information.
A crucial element of my model is the characterization of the way reference prices
distort the actually observed prices. There are some guiding forces towards such a
4I am assuming here that the reference price does not affect the intrinsic valuation for the item.
This is appropriate when the price does not serve as a signal of quality and when we are thinking of
a good for private consumption, not for resale.
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formulation. First, if the good is free the reference price should have no effect. Second,
the price function should capture the empirically established and sensible idea that
the effect of a reference price is to make a price that is higher than it look (even)
higher and a price that is lower than it look (even) lower. By the same token, when
the observed price coincides with the reference price there should be no distortion.
Finally, we would expect the adjusted price to be non-negative. Thus, I would like to
posit the following:
Axiom 3 The price function has the following properties:
a) P (0; .) ≡ 0
b) P (x; x) = x ∀x ∈ R+
c) 0 ≤ P (x; y) < x if y > x > 0
d) P (x; y) > x if 0 ≤ y < x.
In order to simplify the proofs and to clarify intuition, I also make the following
innocuous assumption:
Assumption 1 P (.; y) is strictly increasing and differentiable, except for a possible
kink at y.
Note that while I allow for it, I do not assume the equivalent of loss aversion
(higher directional derivative of P (p; y) at p = y from above than from below y) in
this scenario. The jury is still out on how general the existence of loss aversion is,
for example in the context of frequently purchased grocery products (c.f. Bell and
Lattin, 2000), which is one of my prime applications.
In most of the paper I will only use Axioms 1-3 to derive my results. However,
for illustrational purposes it is useful to have a concrete functional form in mind.
Preferably one that is easy to estimate and to use in calculations, and one that makes
use of Occam’s razor.
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I would also like to use the concrete functional form for the price function as an
opportunity to add a parameter to its description. This parameter is a measure of
the intensity of the reference price effect. As for the actual functional form, I propose
the following:5
Pα(p; p
R) := p
(
1 + α
p− pR
pR
)
. (1)
Here, α (≥ 0) is the intensity parameter. When α = 0, there is no distortion, P0(p; .) ≡
p, while the size of distortion,
∣∣Pα(p; pR)− p∣∣ , is increasing in α. This is an appealingly
simple formula. Perhaps, the only fly in the ointment is that when α exceeds 1, the
adjusted price may turn out to be negative (for p small). For tractability’s sake, in
the rest of the paper I will simply assume that α ≤ 1, which is equivalent to an upper
bound of 2 on the slope of the price function at the reference price.
3 Willingness to pay
The simplest formulation of consumer choice is to look at a single binary purchasing
decision in isolation.6 Then, a consumer is going to buy if the utility of her current
wealth is no greater than the utility of the good and of her current wealth minus the
price. The price that would make the consumer indifferent between buying or not is
defined as her valuation, which we will denote by v. Its defining equation is then
U (w, 0) = U (w − v, 1) , (2)
where w denotes wealth, and the second argument of the utility function is an indi-
cator function.
A consumer’s valuation of an object is a basic building block for all trade mod-
els, whether disaggregate (say, bilateral bargaining) or aggregate (say, a competitive
5This price function is convex. If that is considered inappropriate, say because we might expect
the reference price effect to decrease for very high prices, a logistic function could be used as an
alternative.
6The typical example is buying (or not) a durable good.
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market). Hence, the reference price effect on valuations can have far-reaching conse-
quences.
With reference prices, the consumer’s willingness to pay, denoted by vR, does no
longer coincide with his valuation, defined above as v. Rather, it is implicitly defined
by the adjusted price which solves (2):
U (w, 0) = U
(
w − P (vR; pR), 1
)
. (3)
Note that — as utility is increasing in wealth — this means that the adjusted price when
the consumer is charged his willingness to pay equals his valuation: P (vR; pR) = v.
This observation has some direct implications.
Proposition 1 If the reference price exceeds her valuation for an item, then the
consumer will be willing to spend more than her valuation on the item. On the other
hand, if the reference price is less than her valuation for an item, then the consumer
will not be willing to pay as much as her valuation for the item.
Proof. Given P (vR; pR) = v, and that the adjusted price is increasing in the
price, by Axiom 3 it is immediate that pR > (<)v implies vR > (<)v.
I show in the Appendix that the aggregate effect of this distortion is to make the
(residual) demand curve more elastic, and consequently it results in lower prices in
monopoly and in imperfect competition (even with differentiated products). Here, I
would just like to emphasize that Proposition 1 provides a simple explanation for some
important stylized facts: on the one hand, in periods of generalized price reductions
(sales) people tend to buy things that they do not really need (that is, they pay for
the item more than what it is worth to them) just because it is a “good deal” — in
the sense that the price is lower than the reference price which is identified with the
pre-sale price; on the other hand, even when people are extracted all their surplus
and pay their “willingness to pay” for an item that they value highly — in the sense
that their valuation exceeds their reference price — they are usually happy with their
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purchase, indicating that ex post they are not truly indifferent.7
This latter point underlines the importance of distinguishing what goes on in the
consumer’s mind at the time of the purchasing decision and once she has “cooled off”.
A variant of this idea was first proposed by Thaler (1985):
3.1 Transaction utility
Thaler proposes a decomposition of the change in a consumer’s utility as a result of
buying an item into two — additive — components. The first one is just the standard
change as a result of losing the price and gaining the item — the “acquisition utility” —
while the second one is a function of the difference between the price and the reference
price, which he calls “transaction utility”, t(pR − p). This latter function is assumed
to be increasing, convex below and concave above zero. In other words, “good”
surprises give a positive kick, while “bad” ones result in a negative utility shock.
He also assumes that the negative shocks are larger and thus the term exhibits loss
aversion (t(p − pR) < −t(pR − p) for p > pR). As I show below, the transaction
utility function can be thought of as a special case of the price function, at least
when welfare considerations are not an issue. Indeed, within the context of a single
purchasing decision, my approach can be thought of as a (slight) generalization of
Thaler’s theory.
Formally, in my notation (which also allows for wealth effects), Thaler’s set-up
defines the customer’s willingness to pay as the price which solves
U (w, 0) = U (w − p, 1) + t(pR − p). (4)
Implicitly defining P ′(p; pR) as U
(
w − P ′(p; pR), 1
)
≡ U (w − p, 1) + t(pR − p), we
can reproduce the Thaler set-up (c.f. (3) and (4)) as long as the resulting P ′(p; pR)
7Such behavior could be behind the experimental results on bargaining, which are usually ex-
plained by people having a mixture of "social" and selfish preferences (c.f. Bolton 1991). The
reference price may be seen as the "social focal point". One could analyze standard bargaining
protocols with players "suffering" from reference price bias and possibly explain bargaining data.
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satisfies Axiom 3. Using the fact that utility is strictly increasing in wealth, this can
be easily verified — except that the resulting price function does not always yield a
non-negative adjusted price.8 This minor discrepancy is actually the tip of an iceberg,
as we will see next.
In terms of the outcome of a single binary choice, whether the reference price
affects the utility of the consumer or the perceived price is unimportant. As we will
see in the next sections, once we consider the bigger picture of consumer behavior,
the conceptual innovation becomes relevant. First, however, I would like to highlight
an important issue regarding welfare. Even if the choices made following either of
the two approaches coincide, the consumer’s utility derived from the purchase will be
different. My model implies that after the fact only the acquisition utility matters,
while the Thaler approach would take full account of the transaction utility as well.9
I believe that the reference-price bias is more important at the point of the purchasing
decision than the actual share of the transaction utility of total utility. Some time
after the purchase the reference-price effect fades away. Thus, the discounted lifetime
value of the good is likely to dwarf the transaction utility. However, at the time of
trade, the reference-price effect can be very strong. My model allows for incorporating
that strong effect without distorting welfare.10 Of course, the best model is probably
in between. I would be happy to include a transaction utility term as well as the
price distortion. It is just more didactic to concentrate on the extreme case where
the price function replaces transaction utility.
8Note, however, that my approach is more general, as the above process cannot be inverted (the
resulting transaction utility function will not be a function of p− pR in general).
9That is why sometimes we need a negative price in the price function to capture the aditional
utility incorporated in the transaction utility term.
10An alternative could be to incorporate psychological effects on utility in case an opportunity
to “save” is missed. Such “regret” would appear on the other side of the inequality and thus not
affect the overall utility if the purchase was indeed made. It would be difficult to rationalize the
corresponding effect for higher than expected prices though.
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4 Optimizing the amount to buy
The consumer’s decision becomes more interesting when the choice variable is con-
tinuous, rather than binary. According to my formulation, there are no degrees of
freedom as to how to formalize this and the corresponding optimization problem is
straightforwardly defined as
x∗ = argmax
x≥0
U
(
w − pAx, x
)
,
where the second argument is no longer an indicator function, rather it signifies the
(real) number of units bought.
That is, since it is the unit price that is distorted, the distortion gets scaled up
linearly by the amount bought. If we used the Thaler approach, we would have no
theoretical indication as to how the transaction utility should depend on the amount
of the purchase. As a result, the two approaches are not directly comparable (however,
see the next section).
The first-order condition for a maximum is
U2
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
= U1
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
pA. (5)
The second-order conditions are U11
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
< 0, U22
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
< 0, and
U11U22 > U21U12. The first two of these, capture the idea of decreasing marginal
value both for wealth and for the good and therefore are likely to be satisfied. The
third condition is also sensible, as they basically say that the effect on the slope of
the utility function of increasing either wealth or the quantity of the good should
be no smaller in the same dimension than in the other one. Since I am looking for
interesting applications where there is an interior optimum, I assume that the third
condition is also satisfied at the solution to (5).
Differentiating both sides of (5) with respect to pA and rearranging, we obtain
dx∗
dpA
=
x∗
(
U21 − p
AU11
)
+ U1
U22 − pA (U21 + U12) + (pA)
2 U11
.
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Therefore, U21
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
≥ pAU11
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
and pAU12
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
≥
U22
(
w − pAx∗, x∗
)
together are sufficient conditions for consumption to be decreas-
ing in the (adjusted) price. These conditions are consistent with the second-order
conditions.
When the sufficient conditions hold, we have the intuitive result that a positive
(negative) price surprise, pR − p > (<)0, increases (decreases) the amount bought
relative to the standard model. As a straightforward consequence — holding the actual
price constant — the total spend also varies in the same direction. This means that
when a good is unusually cheap the consumer actually spends more as a result of the
reference-price effect. Similarly, observing an unexpectedly high price the consumer
decreases the amount bought so that overall she ends up spending less. These results
implicitly also tell us how the amount purchased of the other goods will vary with
today’s reference-price effect, as the money left over for those purchases will change.
This observation leads us to an alternative formulation of the problem:
5 Consumer choice with a soft budget constraint11
The analysis in the previous section perhaps requires too much rationality from our
consumer, as she is implicitly required to solve a life-cycle problem, which we know
empirically that she can/does not (c.f. Thaler, 1990). In order to simplify her prob-
lem, let us make the usual assumption about intertemporal separation, namely that
she has a certain amount of money to spend in the current period. Thus, we consider
a consumer choosing her preferred bundle of n goods given a budget. According to
my theory, reference prices affect her choice via the prices and therefore, exclusively
through the budget constraint. In effect, given her budget, B, she solves:
11Pun intended! It was another Hungarian, János Kornai, who introduced the term soft budget
constraint in his analysis of a command economy, where budgets were cut if firms underspent and
debts written off if firms overspent. His concept has nothing to do with consumer choice though.
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argmax
x≥0
u (x1, x2, ..., xn) s.t.
n∑
i=1
pAi xi ≤ B. (6)
Note that the crucial consequence of this formulation is that the budget constraint
will be satisfied for the adjusted, rather than the actual prices. As a result, in general
the consumer will either under- or overspend relative to her budget!12
Understandably, this may sound odd at first. Without a saving motive, spending
less than the budget is sub-optimal, while spending more than it sounds infeasible.
However, it actually makes a lot of sense, if one recalls that the static model is
just a sub-problem of a dynamic scenario. My basic assertion is that the amount of
money available for consumption at a given point in time is not fixed. The budgets
consumers use in their optimization are only ‘notional,’ they mainly exist to simplify
the complexity of the problem. I am not assuming that budgets are fully elastic
and income can costlessly be moved across periods. Rather I claim that budgets are
not fully inelastic. For most purchase decisions of most consumers (in the developed
countries) there is sufficient flexibility — think of a credit card, for example — to borrow
against future income (or additional effort!) at a (small) cost. Similarly, there is no
major obstacle to saving, even retaining the real value of funds.
The heterogeneity of budget elasticities in the population can be neatly captured
by differing intensities of the reference-price effect (α). This brings us to an interest-
ing observation: it may make sense to treat this parameter asymmetrically around
the reference price. A person with low borrowing potential may be unaffected by un-
12Note that if we added a transaction utility term to the objective function, the chosen bundle
would be unaffected (if interior), as the transaction utility only depends on the unit price. If the
transaction utility entered the objective function in a multiplicative way — thereby making the
transaction utility associated to each good dependent on the quantity purchased of it — it would
in general affect the chosen bundle, but the budget would still be exhausted. This could lead to
situations where if all goods resulted in a similar sticker shock, the outcome (though not the welfare)
would be the same as without the surprise. In my model, the consumer would adjust total spending
according to the sign of the shock. I will revisit this issue later in this section.
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expectedly low prices (low α), but be still very sensitive to unexpectedly high prices
(high α). Note that this would be very similar to the effect of loss aversion.
Even solving problems like (6) are quite difficult for the average consumer, espe-
cially when they have lots of items to buy.13 The natural way boundedly rational
consumers simplify their optimization problem is to have notional budgets also for
subsets (categories) of the goods they are buying.14 So much for fruit, for milk prod-
ucts, for wine etc. Then they can separately optimize in each subset. The next
subsection formalizes this idea, followed by the formal analysis of the consumer’s
choice with a soft budget constraint.
5.1 A simple model of consumer behavior
Let the planning horizon of our consumer be T periods. She has some disposable
income, M , for the planning horizon, to spend on planned purchases.15 There are K
≥ T categories of goods that she buys. We denote by xk the amount (or quality
16) she
purchases of each category. Based on her experience and the available information,
she forms an expectation of the price for each category, pEk . Thus, she can calculate
the optimal bundle to buy during the planning horizon using these expected prices
(that is, the reference prices). This will result in notional budgets for each period.
From the consumer’s point of view prices are random and she only finds them
out when she observes them, period by period. As actual prices may differ from the
expected ones the consumer may suffer a “sticker shock”. The effect of this surprise
is a price distortion, which is modelled following Section 2 of this paper. As argued
above, this may lead to an outlay which is either above or below the notional budget.
Crucially, however, the imbalance need not affect consumer behavior in the sub-
13Think of a weekly grocery shopping, for example.
14See Heath and Soll (1996) and Thaler (1999), for a discussion of theory and evidence about the
mental budgeting process.
15Exceptional expenses are ignored in this version of the model.
16In order to interpret xk as the quality rather than quantity of a product, we would need to
consider non-linear prices. While this is clearly doable, for simplicity, I stick to linear prices.
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sequent decisions (within the same planning horizon). Note that the consumer does
“feel” that she has just spent her notional budget, even if this is not the case. Con-
sequently, until she “counts her money” and re-optimizes17 — which we assume she is
doing every T periods — the amount actually spent in a period will not influence her
future behavior. The size of T is thus an important parameter. Crucially, it cannot
be infinity (or very large) as that would amount to the consumer ignoring her lifetime
budget constraint.
One way of dealing with this problem could be to require that in period T the true
budget constraint for the entire planning horizon must be satisfied. This is feasible,
if we assume that while the consumer does not count her money until the last period
of the planning horizon, she does notice when she runs out of it, say, by reaching her
credit limit (or, in a supermarket, she can return some of the items from her shopping
cart).
5.2 Optimal choice with a soft budget constraint
I now derive the optimal bundle the consumer chooses within each period. I assume
that, for the purpose of this analysis, the groupings of categories into the same period
are exogenously given — say, because they are sold in the same shop (or even in
the same aisle). Let the consumer have the single-parameter, constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) utility function. To simplify matters, I assume that there is only
one good subject to reference-price bias and the rest can be grouped together as if
they were a single commodity. That is, our consumer solves the following problem
argmaxU (x1, x2) = [x
ρ
1 + x
ρ
2]
1
ρ s.t. p1x1 + p
A
2 x2 ≤ m.
17That the frequency with which consumers (or investors) take stock of their activities can be a
relevant parameter was first shown by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), where they could explain the
equity premium puzzle by using loss aversion and yearly evaluation of stock returns.
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It is straightforward to derive the resulting demand functions (for ρ < 1):
x∗1 =
mp
1
ρ−1
1
p
ρ
ρ−1
1 + (p
A
2 )
ρ
ρ−1
, x∗2 =
m
(
pA2
) 1
ρ−1
p
ρ
ρ−1
1 + (p
A
2 )
ρ
ρ−1
.
We then have the following result:
Proposition 2 Relative to the standard model
1. Own demand, x∗2, and own expenditure, p2x
∗
2, are always higher (lower) if the
own price, p2, is below (above) the reference price.
2. Cross demand, x∗1, and cross expenditure, p1x
∗
1, are higher (lower) if either the
own price, p2, is below (above) the reference price and ρ < 0, or if the own price
is above (below) the reference price and ρ > 0.
3. For Cobb-Douglas preferences (ρ = 0), cross demand and cross expenditure are
unaltered by the reference-price effect.
Proof. The derivative of x∗2 with respect to p
A
2 is easily seen to be negative for
ρ < 1. As pA2 > (<)p2 ⇔ p
R
2 < (>)p2, the first result follows. The derivative of
x∗1 with respect to p
A
2 is easily seen to be negative (positive) for ρ < (>)0. Again
pA2 > (<)p2 ⇔ p
R
2 < (>)p2 implies the second result. Finally, the derivative of x
∗
1
with respect to pA2 is zero for ρ = 0.
Unlike in the life-cycle model above, now we can compare some of the predictions
of Thaler’s model with those of mine. While we would expect that the qualitative
effects on own demand would be the same with the transaction utility approach, cross
demand would necessarily have to move in the opposite direction to compensate
for the under- or over-spend. Thus, for relatively complementary goods (ρ < 0)
the effects on cross demand are in opposing directions for the two approaches. I
predict movement in the same direction for both goods, while Thaler’s model implies
changes in opposing directions. At the end of the spectrum, for Leontieff preferences
(ρ = −∞), the transaction utility approach would result in no change from the
standard optimal bundle x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
m
p1+p2
, while my model predicts x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
m
p1+pA2
.
15
5.3 Precautionary under-budgeting
An interesting question is how a rational consumer, who knew that she suffered from
reference-price bias, would try to mitigate its effects.18 As at the time of purchase she
cannot help herself, the only way to influence her decision is by setting “sub-optimal”
notional budgets. Note that decreasing the soft budget assigned to a (joint) pur-
chasing decision unambiguously lowers the amount spent (for every realization of the
actual price). With Cobb-Douglas preferences the variance of the amount spent also
decreases, as the purchase decisions become separable and the notional budget enters
the error term multiplicatively:
(
1− p
pA
)
wn. Thus, under the reasonable assump-
tion that overspending is more costly than underspending, Cobb-Douglas preferences
should lead to conservative notional budget assignments. This is consistent with Pen-
nings et al. (2005) where they find that budget-constrained consumers tend to spend
less than their budget.
Note, however, that for other types of preferences the result is not obvious as in
the calculation of the variance of spending the “covariances” enter the picture. For
example, if there are two goods and the consumer has a very high reference price for
one of them but a very low one for the other the expected value of
(
pA1 − p1
) (
pA2 − p2
)
will be negative, which might lead to the overall variance being increasing in the
notional budget.
6 Empirical evidence
Heilman et al. (2002) found that consumers given a ($1.00) coupon19 at the store
entrance for an item that they planned to buy tended to increase their spending on
unplanned items — relative to a control group — by (seven times) more than their
18This is related to the idea that mental budgeting can be used for self-control purposes, c.f.
Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
19Unfortunately, a coupon is (presumably) only valid for a single unit, so it is not equivalent to a
price reduction.
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coupon saving. I am somewhat sceptical about the authors’ claim that the experi-
mental subjects did not anticipate the windfall ($5.00) after their shopping from the
organizers. Also, the results seem to be more driven by “mood” effects, which I — as
an economist — am not qualified to appraise. In any case, my model — in its current
form — is not apt for predicting unplanned purchases. The spending on planned items
remained constant. Unfortunately, the value of the coupon was too low relative to the
total spend to make it possible to establish whether the total spending on the planned
items was affected by the coupon’s value. As a result, the data cannot be used to
detect spill-overs to other planned items. What is clear is that these spill-overs could
not be large, even if they existed. In conclusion, the findings of Heilman et al. (2002)
do not shed much light on the empirical validity of my model’s predictions.
Janakiraman et al. (2006) provide a seemingly much better suited experimental
design for out purposes. In their main study the subjects are asked to minimize the
aggregate cost of stocking a dozen different goods over 35 periods. Their inventory of
any good cannot exceed 4. They can go shopping in each period at a fixed cost, but
they must shop in case they stock out of something (stocks are depleted “randomly”
from the point of view of the subjects). Upon such “mandatory” shopping trips the
price of the stocked-out item is raised or lowered by 80%.
They find that there is a negative spill-over effect: if prices are high (low) in a
category the consumer spends more (less) on the other categories. Unfortunately, this
set-up is not amenable to establish whether my prediction, that consumers increase
spending on sale items and decrease spending on unusually expensive items (let alone
the resulting spill-overs), holds. This is so because, by construction, one can only
spend 80% of the standard budget — 4 items at 20% of the price — on sale items and
one must spend at least the price of 1.8 units — 1 unit at 180% of the price — on
overpriced items. As the average uptake of regularly-priced units was 1.6, this cannot
result in an underspend.
Genesove and Mayer (2001) look at seller, rather than buyer, behavior. However,
there is no reason to believe why the price distortions would look qualitatively different
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from a seller’s point of view. Therefore, I can use their analysis to test my model.
They look into the explanation of why sellers are setting “unreasonably” high asking
prices during economic downturns, that is when they are likely to realize a (nominal)
loss relative to the purchase price. They claim that their empirical results validate
the loss aversion hypothesis. However, they are only looking at losses, not at gains.
Therefore, what they really show is not that losses have higher effects on utility than
gains, simply that losses have an effect relative to the standard theory. But that
means that their findings are supporting my theory just as well as loss aversion.
7 Conclusion
I this paper I propose a fresh way of looking at reference price effects in a model of
consumer choice. The idea that it is the prices, not the preferences that are distorted
has interesting consequences, witness the concept of a soft budget constraint.
There are a number of limiting factors of the current model. It relies on marginal
effects and as such divisibility of the products is important. It also side-steps dynamic
inventory optimization, thereby being more applicable for perishables.
While I have provided a number of testable predictions above, there are lots of
implications of my approach that could not be followed up here. I am especially
thinking of dynamic pricing and models of negotiation. These could be followed up
in another paper.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Monopoly
In this section we investigate the effect of the consumers’ perception of prices accord-
ing Axioms 1-3 on the price set by a monopolist.
Assume that in the standard context (no reference price), demand would be given
by the differentiable function, D(p), where D(1) = 0, D(0) = a for some a < ∞,
and −∞ < D′ < 0. Assume as well that the demand function satisfies the monotone
hazard rate property — that is, that D(.)/D′(.) is increasing.
Assuming, for simplicity, that the cost of production is zero, it is immediate that
the monopoly price would be the unique interior solution to
D(pM) = −pMD′(pM). (7)
Now, suppose that the monopolist learns that the way consumers perceive prices
is according to Axioms 1-3, with a common reference price and price function for
all.20
The first issue to look at is how the demand function is transformed as a result
of reference price dependence. That is, what is the relationship between the original
demand and the one created as a result of reference price dependence. Let us denote
the “new” demand curve by DR(.). Then we have that DR(p) ≡ D(p
A(p)). By Axiom
3, DR(p
R) = D(pR), that is, at the reference price the two demand curves coincide. In
addition, we also have that DR(p) < D(p) for p > p
R and DR(p) > D(p) for p < p
R.
In other words, D(pA(p)) is qualitatively a counter-clockwise rotation of D(p) around
20The commonality of the reference price follows endogenously, see below. The common price
function is assumed just for simplicity.
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the point (pR, D(pR)). It is important to note though that, if and only if the price
function has slope one at the reference price, will the slopes ofDR(.) andD(.) coincide
at p = pR.
What will the new monopoly price be?
We can write total revenue as pD(pA), yielding the first-order condition
D(pA) = −pD′(pA)
dpA
dp
. (8)
Note that the optimal adjusted monopoly price will be a function of the (common)
reference price of the consumers.
If it is common knowledge that the monopolist is aware of the reference price
dependence of consumer demand, then the consumers rationally21 expect the mo-
nopolist to set a price solving (8). This price will then naturally play the role of the
reference price in their adjusted price function.22 The monopoly price in this Rational
Expectations Equilibrium must then be equal to the reference price.
Proposition 3 The monopoly price under rational expectations is lower than the
monopoly price in the absence of a reference price: pRE ≤ pM . If the left derivative
of P (p, pM) at p = pM is > 1, then pRE < pM .
Proof. If the price function is differentiable, — from (8) — the RE price is given
by the unique solution to
D(pRE) = −pRED′(pRE)
dP (p, pRE)
dp
[pRE]. (9)
By Axiom 3 dP (p,p
RE)
dp
≥ (>)1. By the monotone hazard rate property of the demand
function, this implies pRE ≤ (<)pM . Let us denote the left and right derivatives dL/d
21We could have adaptive expectations as well, but the interesting price is the one where the
monopolist settles.
22Note that even if the price functions were hetereogeneous, as long as their distribution were
common knowledge, the rational expectations price would be common to all consumers.
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and dR/d, respectively. Then (9) can be rewritten as
D(pRE) ≤ −pRED′(pRE)
dLP (p, p
RE)
dp
[pRE],
D(pRE) ≥ −pRED′(pRE)
dRP (p, p
RE)
dp
[pRE]. (10)
Since diP (p,p
RE)
dp
≥ 1, i = L,R, there is clearly no incentive to increase the price beyond
the monopoly price. By the same token, a downward change is always profitable if
and only if dLP (p,p
RE)
dp
> 1.
Putting the technical issues aside, the intuition is clear: as the (inverse) demand
function is “rotated” counter-clockwise, the price elasticity of demand is decreased at
the original monopoly price, so unit-elasticity is reached at a lower price.
8.2 Oligopoly
In this section we investigate to what extent the price reducing effect observed in the
monopoly context carries over to a market with (imperfect)23 competition. To do
this, we will look at a Cournot oligopoly. It is quite intuitive that the effects observed
in case of monopoly will also appear when an oligopolist reacts to a residual demand
curve. In order to establish this result, we write the total revenue of producer i as
pqi. This leads to the first-order condition
∂p
∂pA
∂pA
∂qi
qi + p = 0.
Using that dD(p
A)
dqi
= D′(pA)∂p
A
dqi
= 1, and that nqi = D(p
A), we obtain the equilibrium
condition
D(pRE)
∂p
∂pA
[pRE] = −npRED′(pRE).
When pA is differentiable, by Axiom 3, ∂p
∂pA
[pRE] < 1, while in the standard model it
is 1. Thus, we have shown that
23It is obvious that under perfect competition there will be no such effect.
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Proposition 4 When the price function is differentiable, the Cournot price under
rational expectations is strictly lower than the Cournot price in the absence of a
reference price: pRE(n) < pC(n).
The question we would like to shed some light on next, is the interplay between
the amount competition and the reference price effects. In order to be able to look at
comparative statics, Let us assume that (inverse) demand is linear, given by p = A−Q,
where Q is the aggregate quantity produced. Also, let us use the specific functional
form proposed above, (1).
Proposition 5 In the rational expectations equilibrium of a Cournot competition
with n producers24 the equilibrium price is given by
pRE(n, α) =
A
1 + n(1 + α)
.
Proof. Each competitor maximizes pqi in qi.Inverting the price function it is
immediate that the actual price as a function of the reference and adjusted prices is
given by
p = −
(1− α) pR
2α
+
√(
(1− α) pR
2α
)2
+
pRpA
α
. (11)
Since consumers use pA to guide their decisions, the (inverse) demand is given by
pA = A−
∑
qi. Taking the first-order condition of pqi, imposing symmetry and using
that in equilibrium p = pA = pR, we have
p(1 + α) = q =
A− p
n
.
Solving for p yields the claimed result.
In this proposition the effects of the level of competition and the intensity of the
reference price effect are confounded. The interesting question is how the relative
reference price effect varies with n.
Corollary 1 The proportional reduction in the price as a result of the reference price
effect increases with the number of competitors,
∂(pRE(n,α)/pRE(n,0))
∂n
= − α
(1+n(1+α))2
< 0.
24Note that the proposition also covers the monopoly (n = 1) case.
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8.3 Horizontally differentiated products
In a Hotelling set-up, for any transportation cost that does not cause technical diffi-
culties, the demand functions are once again more own-price elastic. Thus, for fixed
locations, prices will be lower with reference-price effects.
As a further consequence, the increased price competition will tend to increase
the incentives for differentiation relative to the standard case.
In a monopolistically competitive market, again prices will be lower. This will
alleviate the problem of operating below the efficient scale, but increase the business
stealing effect. As a result, the overall effect on the amount of entry is in general
indeterminate.
8.4 Vertically differentiated products
In this section I investigate how the presence of reference price effects influences the
reaction of consumers of a good provided by a monopolist to the introduction of
an inferior substitute by a competitor. This setup is motivated by the wide-spread
worry that globalization (understood as international trade) undermines the market
viability of locally produced high quality goods (c.f. Kiyotaki and Moore, 2003).
Assume that the incumbent (Firm 1) and the entrant (Firm 2) are located at
the two endpoints of a two-unit-long Hotelling interval. Consumers are uniformly
distributed between the incumbent and the midpoint of the interval, capturing the
vertical differentiation aspect. Travel costs are linear and each consumer values the
good at 2 minus his travel cost. Finally, the constant marginal cost of the incumbent
is 1, while that of the entrant is zero. For tractability, I also assume that the price
function is linear: pAi = pi + α(pi − p
R).
Proposition 6 When the entrant affects the market share of the incumbent, the latter
is 3−α
6
.
Proof. The entrant will only affect the market share of the incumbent if all
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consumers purchase. In that case the marginal consumer is given by the x value
solving x + pA1 = 2 − x + p
A
2 , leading to x
∗(p1, p2) =
2+(1+α)(p2−p1)
2
. The profits of
Firm 1 are given by (p1 − 1) x
∗(p1, p2), leading to the best response function p1(p2) =
2+(1+α)(p2+1)
2(1+α)
.
Under full market coverage, the entrant’s problem is to maximize p2 (1− x
∗(p1, p2)) ,
which leads to p2(p1) = p1/2. Otherwise, the entrant’s prices do not affect the incum-
bent’s market share.
Solving for the prices with full market coverage, we obtain p1 =
6+2α
3(1+α)
, p2 =
3+α
3(1+α)
.
The resulting marginal consumer will be 3−α
6
.
Thus the incumbent market share is strictly decreasing in the intensity of reference
price dependence, significantly increasing the business-stealing effect.
Note that the market share is independent of the reference price in the above
proposition. This is due to the linearity of the price function. If we used the quadratic
formulation introduced earlier instead then we would have an additional effect low-
ering the incumbent’s market share as the marginal consumer would be negatively
related to the reference price (holding the actual prices constant).
The general idea is quite clear even without a formal analysis. The incumbent
firm will always be the one that determines the reference price. Even if the entrant’s
quality is lower, the reference price will always be above the price the entrant would set
in a world without a reference-price effect. As a result, the entrant’s prices will always
be seen favorably while the incumbent’s unfavorably, leading to a larger equilibrium
market share for the entrant.
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